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Orthodox neoclassical economics portrays reason as far more important than 
emotion, autonomy as more characteristic of economic life than social connection, and, 
more generally, things culturally and cognitively associated with masculinity as more 
central than things associated with femininity. Research from contemporary neuroscience 
suggests that such biases are related to certain automatic processes in the brain, and 
feminist scholarship suggests ways of getting beyond them. The "happiness" and 
"interpersonal relations" research programs have made substantial progress in 
overcoming a number these biases. Analysis from a feminist economics perspective 
suggests, however, several fronts on which research could most profitably continue. 
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Getting Past "Rational Man/Emotional Woman": 
How Far Have Research Programs in Happiness and 
Interpersonal Relations Progressed? 
 




Economic research projects on happiness and interpersonal relationships are 
making a number of exciting advances, relative to economic orthodoxy. In many cases, 
old dogmas are being rejected, and results from cognitive psychology, social psychology, 
evolutionary biology, neuroscience, and related scientific fields are enriching economists' 
study of human behavior and well-being. 
 
The traditional neoclassical model based on purely rational, purely autonomous 
"economic man" is being challenged at many levels. As psychologist Daniel Kahneman 
and his colleagues have famously pointed out, human decision making does not follow 
strict rules of logic. Instead, “[T]his marvelous creation [the human cognitive system] 
differs in important respects from…the rational agent assumed in economic theory.” 
(Kahneman 2003, 1454). Our decisions arise from cognitive processes developed over 
evolutionary time, through the development of flesh-and-blood bodies with brains and 
nervous systems. “Twentieth-century science," neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has said, 
" left out the body…” (Damasio 1994, 39). Behavioral economics (using that term in a 
broad sense) approaches economics using evidence on what real, embodied humans being 
do--rather than what abstract axiom-obeying agents would do, if they existed. An 
empirical and experimental approach to behavior is challenging the former blind faith in 
deduction from first principles. Brain scans using functional Magnetic Resonancing 
Imagery (fMRI) or similar machines are being used to look at how different areas of the 
brain--often roughly categorized a specializing in analytical versus affective processes—
react to experiences and participate in decision-making. The Nobel award in economics 
given to Kahneman for his contributions to behavioral economics was well-deserved. 
 
Happiness research, likewise, questions the idea that "economic man" is purely 
rational. In this field, phenomena such as felt satisfaction with life and experienced affect 
play a leading role (Bruni and Porta 2007). In some ways, this follows from the insights 
about less-than-perfect rationality: When we can no longer simply assume that choices 
lead to the best outcomes, we are forced to reexamine the question of what we mean by 
"best." Happiness researchers make important distinctions between the outcomes of 
choice and the achievement of well-being, or between "decision" utility and 
"experienced" utility (van Praag 2005). 
 
While it is, as yet, a newer and smaller field, the economics of interpersonal 
relations is also breaking important new ground. People are not the autonomous monads 
assumed in neoclassical theory, but are instead deeply social creatures. In this case too, 
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we could appeal to recent advances in social psychology and neuroscience--such as the 
discovery of "mirror cells" in the brain (Iacoboni 2008)--to justify opening this new 
frontier in economics. 
 
In addition to being intellectually compelling, research programs in happiness and 
interpersonal relations (henceforth, "HIR") also have potentially important implications 
for how we live. In a time of recession and rapid deterioration of environmental 
resources, for example, the finding that we tend to be on a "hedonic treadmill" may be 
crucial. Could we perhaps be made better off by shifting personal and social resources 
away from materials-using, carbon-emitting activities and towards more relationship and 
intrinsic-enjoyment-intensive pursuits (Frank 2005; Pugno 2008)? Such a question cannot 
even be asked within the old paradigm. 
 
Once one appreciates the value of these new developments, of course, one may 
wonder how economists could have been blind to such phenomena for so long. One sees 
that orthodox theory, while conceptually simple and elegant, is consistent neither with 
lived experience nor with the findings of many other fields. One can also see that what 
currently passes for orthodoxy is itself an aberration from important, longerrunning 
themes in economics concerning well-being and the role of emotions and sociality, going 
back to figures such as Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith. New horizons for research, 
and new ways of understanding economic life, are opened up relative to the mainstream 
of economics in recent decades. The strictly neoclassical approach seems to be not so 
much characterized by "rigor," as by "rigor mortis." 
 
The news, however, is not all good. Some of the habits of thought that kept us in 
the old ruts have not completely disappeared. This essay uses neuroscience and feminist 
theory to explain how and why certain old, outdated, and damaging ways of thinking may 
continue to permeate much economic research--including research in HIR--and to suggest 




Neuroscientific Findings on Attention and Cognitive Schema 
 
While we generally believe we see the world "as it really is," cognitive 
psychology tells us that in fact our perceptions have systematic biases and gaps. 
Behavioral economists have begun to explore how these influence the behavior of the 
agents we study, but we can also learn interesting and useful things from this literature 
about ourselves as social scientists. 
 
Creating truly accurate picture of the world was not the task that drove the 
evolution of our brains and nervous system: survival was. We have developed—over 
evolutionary time, and also over the time of our own development from infants into 
toddlers and children, and finally to adults—cognitive processes that direct our attention 
towards the aspects of our environment most relevant to a task at hand, and suppress the 
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recognition of distractions. We have also developed cognitive "shortcuts" that reduce the 
time it takes to process certain kinds of stimuli, by classifying and grouping them 
according to mental constructs called "cognitive schema." Psychological research shows 
that cognitive schemas are important ways in which we "organize incoming information 
and integrate it—through no conscious act of will—into clusters" (Most, Sorber et al. 
2007, 288). Stimuli that correspond to an existing schema can be more rapidly processed 
than stimuli that must be individually sorted out and assimilated piece by piece. That is, 
absorbing information congruent with a schema can rely on automatic processes in the 
mind. On the other hand, trying to take in information that is not congruent with an 
existing mental template requires more voluntary, non‐automatic processing, takes more 
mental work, and leads to more mental fatigue. 
 
Studies in cognitive psychology reveal how we use schematic congruence and 
selective attention to perceive the world. The most well‐known is the "color Stroop 
test"(Stroop 1935). In the classic version of this test, subjects are shown a list of the 
names of colors—red, white, green, etc.—printed in either all black, or in the colors that 
are congruent with the names (e.g., "red" is set in red type), and are instructed to read 
these words aloud. Most adults have no trouble reading these lists quickly and accurately. 
Then the subjects are shown a list of the same words, but this time the colors of the 
typeface are incongruent with the meaning of the word: for example, "red" is set in green 
type, and "white" is set in brown type. Laboratory studies show significant decreases in 
the average speed and accuracy of adults' reading performance, when presented with this 
second list. Various hypotheses have been made about the cognitive processes at work, 
but the general agreement is that the brain has to work harder in the second case, to 
actively suppress the irrelevant information offered by the typeface color. 
 
Variants of the Stroop test have been done in fMRI laboratories. These studies 
indicate that different brain regions are associated with doing the congruent and 
incongruent tasks. The Stroop test is sometimes referred to as a test of mental "vitality" 
and "flexibility," as people tend to perform worse on it the more mentally tired they are, 
and older adults tend to perform worse than prime‐age adults. It can be, roughly speaking, 
thought of as a test of how skillful we are at using our voluntary processes to override our 
automatic ones, when our automatic processes are not appropriate for the task at hand. 
 
It seems rather obvious that our brains would tightly link the name of a color and 
the perception of a color, and have to expend effort to break this link apart. But what 
other sorts of automatic associations do we make, and have to expend effort to 
overcome? 
 
It turns out that gender—the association of a stimulus with either masculinity or 
femininity—is another fundamental cognitive schema. We process things more easily and 
quickly if they fit our mental gender constructs, and have to work more if they do not. 
This has been confirmed in a number of studies in cognitive science. For example, in a 
version of the Stroop test called the "Auditory Stroop Test," subjects hear words read out 
loud. When asked to identify, for example, whether a first name is male or female, 
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subjects tend to take longer and make more mistakes when, for example, a male name is 
read by a female voice (the "incongruent" case), than when a male name is read by a male 
voice (the "congruent" case) (Most, Sorber et al. 2007). 
 
Another tool that has often been used to investigate gender (as well as racial) 
schemas is the Implicit Association Test (IAT). In this test, subjects are instructed to tap a 
key to sort a word into the category in which it belongs. In one recent study, for example, 
stereotypical associations of masculinity with strength and femininity with weakness‐‐ 
prevalent in Western, English‐speaking cultures‐‐were used (Knutson, Mah et al. 2007). 
In the congruent case, subjects were told to tap one key if the word "feather," for 
example, was either male or strong, and another key if the word was either female or 
weak. (Most English speakers would classify "feather" as weak.) In contrast, in the 
incongruent situation, they would be asked to tap one key if the word was either male or 
weak, and the other if the word was either female or strong. Subjects tended to take 
longer to respond in the incongruent case. This was also an fMRI study and the 
researchers observed that different parts of the brain were activated in the congruent and 
incongruent situations. This study demonstrates that gender stereotypes form a cognitive 
schema that organizes our thinking in an automatic way, and that it takes mental effort 
and flexibility to overcome these habits of thought. Interestingly, correlations between 
IAT tests and explicit attitudes about gender (or race) are low enough to suggest that 
these automatic processes are often strongly present even in individuals who do not 
consciously endorse sexist (or racist) views.  
 
Another tool, called the Gender‐Science IAT, shows how perceptions of academic 
disciplines tend to be mentally wound up with gender schemas (Nosek, Banaji et al. 
2007). In this test, subjects tend to be quicker at sorting names of disciplines (such as 
"chemistry" or "humanities" into congruent "male or science" and "female or liberal 
arts" categories [slide], than into incongruent "male or liberal arts" and "female or 
science" categories. 
 
Two more aspects of this research into attention and cognitive schemas deserve 
mention. First is the aspect of valence‐‐that is, how we regard some things as being of 
higher value than others. IAT and fMRI studies suggest that in cases where a category is 
attributed with positive or negative valence, the amygdala, a part of the brain often 
associated with emotional response, is also active. Most studied in the case of race, 
studies sometimes suggest that, in particular, fear responses are activated by the 
presentation of disfavored categories. 
 
Second, there is the question of whether these involuntary associations have to 
dictate our behavior. Sometimes automatic processing is simply a helpful, 
brain‐efforteconomizing move that saves us valuable mental energy. But it can also signal 
a rigidity and laziness of mind that creates barriers, when fresh and flexible approaches 
would be more useful for the tasks at hand. Fortunately, there is some evidence that 
deliberate and conscious effort and practice can at least partly prevent the expression of 
implicit associations in behavior. There is also evidence that performance on IATs can be 
5 





influenced by context‐‐for example, various sorts of priming and framing effects ‐‐and 
experience, as subjects get more accustomed to making schema‐incongruent choices. 
Overall, however, the results indicate that these automatic associations are strong, and 
without strong conscious effort and new experiences, they exert considerable invisible 
power over the way we think. 
 
 
Exercising the Brain 
 
Keeping from sliding back into schematic judgments is not an easy task, given the 
strength of these unconscious associations. But perhaps practice in breaking out of the old 
patterns, and some templates for thinking in new ways, could make it more possible. 
The association of masculinity with strength and femininity with weakness, used in the 
IAT test discussed earlier, for example, has no doubt arisen from observation of 
differences on average between males and females in the ability to lift a heavy weight 
using one's upper body, which is an evidence‐based belief.1 Such an observation creates 
distortions of perception, however, when it is illegitimately overgeneralized, via 
cognitive schemas and metaphors, to all individuals or to other situations. The association 
of masculinity with strength, for example, tends to keep us from noticing that there are 
some individual women who can lift substantial weights, and many men who cannot. But 
even more perniciously, the association of women with weakness is often extended into 
believing that women have weak intellects, are weak‐willed, are morally weak, and so 
on—issues for which there is no evidence. We can also note that the association of 
masculinity with strength is selective about the dimension in which physical strength is 
measured: If we think of strong bodies as bodies that tend to live longer, it is women who 
are strong and men who are weak. 
 
Yet the association of men with strength persists. For example, in English the 
word "virility" is commonly known to mean "manly vigor." There is no equivalent 
commonly‐used word for feminine vigor. In fact, femaleness is commonly characterized 
as a lack of masculine attributes. We might diagram this perceived relationship between 
gender and value as shown in Figure 1: masculinity is superior and virile; femininity is 
inferior and emasculated. 
 
Figure 1: Stereotyped Gender and Valence 
 
masculine superior virile 
| 
feminine inferior emasculated 
 
But are all things feminine just degraded forms of masculine characteristics? As a 
tool for developing a more flexible sort of thinking, a “gender‐value compass” (Nelson 
1992; Nelson 1995) may be useful. Consider how the hierarchy pictured in Figure 1, for 
example, changes if one refuses to overlay perceptions of gender with judgments of 
value, and instead splits off the gender axis from the value axis, as shown in Figure 2: 
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    M+   F+  
    virility   muliebrity 
Masculine        Feminine 
    M–    F– 
    ?   emasculation 
 
           Negative 
 
If one looks hard enough in a sufficiently thick dictionary, one can also find the new term 
in the figure. “Muliebrity” means “womanliness,” “possessing full womanly powers,” or 
“the feminine correlative of virility.” While not a term in common use, it suggests that 
alongside and on a par with a masculine, positive strengths we might also consider there 
to be feminine, positive strengths. The cross‐diagonal terms illustrate a condition of lack: 
for example, “emasculation” is an absence of “virility.” There is, unfortunately, currently 
no term in the English language for a lack of womanly vigor. 
 
Or consider the idea that a strong research result is a manly, "hard" research 
result. Research that is "soft" or feminine is considered inferior. But suppose we again 





    M+   F+  
    hard,   soft, 
    strong   flexible 
   
    M–    F– 
    hard,   soft, 
    rigid   weak 
 
 
A research project, for example, that is "hard" in a rigid way cannot stand up to criticism. 
It is a positive complementarity of strength and the flexibility to bend, adapt, and respond 
that makes a research project truly resilient. Good research projects are neither 
one‐sidedly hard or soft, but rather is both strong and flexible. Thinking instead in 
stereotyped "either/or" terms and aiming for only hardness can result, in fact, in a 
weakness: The negative complementarity of rigidity and weakness gives brittle findings 
that shatter easily. The suggestion of this analysis is that the most creative and productive 
options lie in the dynamic tension between the positively‐valued characteristics, often 
(lazily) thought of as polar opposites. 
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While dualistic, unconscious patterns of thought suggest that our only choices are 
"either/or," with some work we may learn to recognize more sophisticated, nuanced, 
"both/and" possibilities. In my own work, I have experimented with using such diagrams 
to break up many reified gender associations. But for now, it is sufficient to merely 
introduce the possibility of getting past old gender‐schematic patterns of thinking about 




Gender and Economics I: Topics and Agents 
 
Where does economics fit in? Our discipline was not one of the options presented 
to subjects in the IAT study about academic fields discussed above. According to 
academic traditions, economics is commonly classified as one of the social sciences, 
when it is not put with management. The social sciences, in turn, are generally included 
in the "liberal arts." It would be highly unusual to find economics classified with the 
physical sciences. 
 
Yet I would expect many economists to resist this classification. Given the 
cultural association of masculinity with both positive valence and with science, one might 
not be too surprised to find, within our profession, a concerted effort to advance and 
preserve the status of economics by advancing and preserving its image of masculinity. In 
a culture where giving into femininity is associated being weak, a certain macho swagger 
might, in fact, be a rational strategy for gaining positional rewards. 
 
Unfortunately, it also creates bad science. Starting around the 1970s, a handful of 
scholars started to identify ourselves as feminist economists, and began to critically 
examine this association of economics with masculinity. What makes scholarship 
"feminist" is not, as is sometimes thought, an attitude of man‐hating, or an insistence that 
men and women are exactly the same. Feminist scholarship, at its most basic, involves a 
questioning of the systematic subordination of women, and investigation into the roots of 
and remedies for this subordination. We began, in economics, with the simple study of 
the demographics of our profession, and questions of labor market discrimination. (I have 
found, from personal experience, that even publishing in Econometrica, the AER and the 
JPE‐‐as I have done‐‐is still not necessarily taken as sufficient evidence of one's skills in 
analysis, if one is a woman (Nelson 2009)). We moved on to critique models of marriage 
and household behavior that simply assumed or excused gross inequities in power 
between men and women (Ferber and Birnbaum 1977). By the early 1990s, we had 
grown in numbers and were examining the role of gender in the shaping the core 
definitions, models, and methods, and the history of the discipline (Ferber and Nelson 
1993). What we found was a pronounced aspiration to defend the one‐sided "manliness" 
of the discipline 
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Consider Table 1. Within neoclassical orthodoxy, economics is generally taken to 
be defined by concern with markets, choice, or both. Women's experiences in families, 
tending to the day‐to‐day bodily needs of people for food and care, are banished (or at 
best marginalized). The economic agent of neoclassical theory is autonomous, self-
interested and rational‐‐characteristics that have a long history of association with men 
and masculinity in Western culture. Interdependence, other‐interest, and emotion are, in 
contrast, culturally coded as both feminine and of lesser importance. Economists were 
happy to relegate these issues to (so‐called) "softer" fields such as sociology, clinical 
psychology, philosophy, or theology. 
 
Table 1: Splitting the World: Content and Model Schemas in Neoclassical 
Orthodoxy 
 
 Economics     Not Economics  
 
markets     social life and family 
mental choice     bodily experience 
 
 individuals     relationships 
 autonomy     interdependence 
 self-interest     other-interest 
 rationality     emotion  
 masculine      feminine   
 
Let me emphasize, here, that this sort of table is by no means meant to reinforce the idea 
that men are really more rational, or women are more really emotional. Feminists make a 
distinction between sex, referring to biological distinctions, and gender, the cultural 
beliefs that societies construct on the basis of perceptions of sex. Feminist economists 
point out that, by looking at only half the world, economics—far from being made more 
objective and rigorous by these exclusions—is made partial and biased. And there is a 
systematic pattern behind many of orthodoxy's biases: They are, as a group, created and 
sustained by the strength of unconscious cognitive schemas relating masculinity to 
superior value. 
 
Behavioral economists and HIR researchers, then, can be commended for the way 
in which they have made progress in overcoming certain outdated, unconscious habits of 
thought. Where neoclassical orthodoxy restricts its attention to only the lefthand side of 
Figure 1, in HIR research social relations and emotions of happiness and unhappiness are 
made much more central. 
 
There are, however, more adequate ways of getting past the old, dualistic, 
gender‐schematic habits, and less adequate ways. One inadequate way is to continue to 
let the left dominate, but bring in a few, still‐denigrated, aspects of the right. In some 
parts of the behavioral economics literature, for example, it is allowed that people are 
emotional, but only to the extent that this may cause them to be "irrational" and make 
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mistakes (e.g. (Cohen 2005). I take this as a continuing sign of masculinist bias, since 
much neuroscience is telling us that emotions are, in fact, an important and necessary 
component of cognition and reasonable behavior (Damasio 1994). Or people are treated 
purely as autonomous individuals first and foremost, and relationships given a distinctly 
subsidiary status. In assuming that people are autonomous individuals who may make 
rational decisions about entering relationships, many economists are following 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his suggestion, “Let us consider men . . . as if but even 
now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, 
without all kind of engagement to each other” (quoted in Benhabib, 1987). Yet humans 
simply do not spring out of the earth. We are born as infants, nurtured and cared for as 
children, socialized into family and community norms, and have bodies that depend on 
the provision of nourishment and shelter. These sorts of relationships, of course, are 
exactly those in women’s traditional domain. To the extent the new literatures admit 
elements of emotion and relationality, but still prioritize reason or individuality, they still 
display a masculinist bias. 
 
In other cases, looking at these pairs in terms of dynamic tensions is avoided by 
flipping completely over to the right‐hand‐column. Some scholarly literature arising from 
certain sociological or "holistic" viewpoints, for example, elevate the right‐hand column 
of Table 1, and completely neglect the left. 
 
In fact, the economics literature on interpersonal relationships is quite 
reminiscent, so far, of the old story of the blind people and the elephant. In this story, one 
blind person encounters the side of the elephant, and says that an elephant is like a wall; 
another encounters a leg, and says that an elephant is like a tree trunk; another, the trunk, 
and says an elephant is like a snake; and so on. Some economists perceive relationships 
in terms of "relational goods" that are "purchased" and enjoyed by rational, 
utility‐maximizing individuals.2 From another perspective, relationships feel like people 
merged together in a feeling of oneness with each other and perfect harmony.3 From yet 
another viewpoint, one observes hierarchies of positional status or domination and 
submission (Gazier and This Saint‐Jean 2005). From yet another, the phenomenon is 
reciprocity among equals (Sacco, Vanin et al. 2004; Bruni and Sugden 2008). Few male 
economists have yet examined the part of the elephant that takes the form of hierarchies 
dedicated to care and nurturance, most exemplified by a mother with her child. In fact, 
family relations of various sorts seem to regularly be under‐analyzed within this new 
literature, perhaps due to a biased view that close relations are simply "natural" rather 
than truly social.4 But perhaps that will come with time—and the lessening of gender 
biases. To all these, I would reply yes, yes, yes, yes, and yes: They are all part of the 
elephant, and only dangerous when their partial nature is not fully recognized. One can 
hope that the current predominance of partial views is only a temporary state, and as the 
fields develop our sophistication (and mutual tolerance, and ability to use a common 
vocabulary) will develop as well. 
 
Perhaps feminist economics can help move this project forward, since we've been 
looking at relational issues in detail since the early 1990s. We noticed that stereotypic 
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views attributed all agency to individual men, and more or less forcibly merged women 
into having interests in only the well‐being of their husbands and children.5 We called the 
one extreme—Mr. John Jones—the "separative self", and the other "Mrs. John Jones," 
with no name of her own—the "soluble self"(Nelson 1995; England 2003). In a 




    M+   F+  
    Individual  Connected 
   
    M–    F– 
    Separative  Soluble 
 
 
That is, the really rich and complex analysis that arises from looking at the tension 
between the poles of individual separation and social connection, is lost when looking at 
the extremes. In Martin Buber’s famous philosophical piece on identity and relation, I 
and Thou, he wrote about the fallacies of a non‐relational worldview in which we 
imagine either “the world. . .embedded in the I, and that there is really no world at all” 
(that is, separativeness), or “the I. . .embedded in the world, and there is really no I at all” 
(that is, solubility) (1958, 71‐2). (1958, pp. 71, 72). A truly relational worldview retains 
the tension. 
 
From this, still very simple, exercise, one can create a simple typology of 
relationships, with the following major possibilities (Nelson 2005): 
 
1. Separative‐separative (arm's length) 
2. Soluble‐soluble (merger) 
3. Separative‐soluble (domination or positionality) 
4. Mutuality (individuals‐in‐relation, with mutual respect and consideration) 
a. Symmetric mutuality (between similarly situated persons) 
b. Asymmetric mutuality (between people in positions characterized by 
unequal power, status, or resources) 
 
This is not meant to be exhaustive, but to remind us of possibilities that remain unseen 
if we start only with the model of radically autonomous, self‐contained and immutable 
agents. In particular, the category of asymmetric mutuality is rarely examined in either 
economics or Western philosophy in general, since it seems to be often assumed that 
mutual respect can only happen in a democracy of equals. Yet such mutuality is what one 
hopes characterizes every child's first and most formative—and necessarily uneven—
relationships, and which one hopes also exists between teachers and students, nurses and 
patients, and in other relations of hierarchy. Asymmetric mutuality deserves more 
examination, as does as the borderline between it and its perverse cousin, domination. 
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Besides broader and richer thinking about the nature of relationships, we need a 
richer and more precise vocabulary for speaking about human emotions and motivations. 
In particular, the dualisms "intrinsic/extrinsic" and "self‐interest/altruism" are used in 
widely varied ways in the existing economics literature, and—since they are overly 
simplistic— often seem to add as much confusion to the discussion as elucidation. Within 
and between categories of "self‐interest" and "altruism," for example, one can identify 
variants including voracious greed, reasonable self‐care, expanded or enlightened 
self‐interest, mutual reciprocity, utilitarianism, interdependent utility, the common good, 
justice, compassion, agape, and outright sacrifice. These variants—and others 
unnamed—all deserve more exploration and clarification. 
 
Recognition of the complexity of relationships has very important real world 
consequences: Many people are, for example, very limited in their thinking about 
economic issues by the stereotypes of totally impersonal markets, purely profit‐oriented 
firms, employment relations of sheer dominance and submission, states that work 
seamlessly in the public interest, peacefully harmonious cooperatives, and/or families that 
are never anything other than gentle and loving. Unpacking the variety of dynamics going 
on in relationships is a critical step in letting more real world complexity into our 
economic analysis (Nelson 2006). 
 
Sometimes, however, rich and complex analysis seems to be exactly what 




Gender and Economics II: Methodology and Demarcation 
 
There is another set of outdated dualisms structuring economics which much of 
HIR research has not, do date, much challenged. The aspiration of economists to be 
considered as "hard" scientists still leads many to assiduously hold to the methodological 
values shown on the left in Table 2. Quantification and precision are prized, and it is 
often mistakenly believed that scientific objectivity is exemplified by process of 
mathematical formalization and an eschewal of value positions. The gender schema is 
clearly at work here as well: Women are culturally associated with more qualitative, 
verbal, intuitive, and personal—and, by association, "inferior" and "weak"— approaches. 
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Table 2: Splitting the World: Methodology Dualisms in Neoclassical Orthodoxy 
 
 Economics     Not Economics 
 
quantitative     qualitative 
 precise      rich 
formal      informal, verbal, or intuitive 
 positive     normative 
 objective      subjective (personal) 
 general     particular 
 
 masculine      feminine   
 
 
The battles that HIR has waged so far on this front have been limited. Getting answers to 
"Subjective Well‐Being" survey questions accepted as economic data has been an uphill 
battle; perhaps it has been at least partially won because, at least, it produces quantitative 
measures that can be inserted into econometric equations. In the still‐small literature on 
economic relations, terms referring to qualitative and rich concepts such as "authenticity," 
"genuineness", or "care" have sometimes entered the conversation. Some researchers are 
willing to look into the rich and non‐formalized history of economic thought for 
inspiration on how to proceed (Bruni and Sugden 2007). 
 
Yet often, it is assumed that qualitative work is just a stepping stone to 
formalism—the "gold standard" for rigor—rather than something valuable and perhaps 
unsurpassable on its own. In my experience, this is the "hot button" (or 
amygdalastimulating) item for many economists. The subjects of our studies and 
assumptions of our models may vary a bit, but threaten the hegemony of our formal 
mathematics— and, in particular, our models of individual utility maximization 
(henceforth, "Max U"), equilibria, game theory, or econometrics—and we feel suddenly 
in danger of seriously losing our bearings. Even if we do not carry through with doing the 
mathematical formalizing ourselves, we may feel that framing a problem in 
utility‐theoretic and quantitatively measurable terms is an absolutely necessary step 
towards rigorous and generalizable science. We may define "economics" itself in terms of 
such achievement. 
 
But, emotional first reactions aside, there are good scientific and practical reasons 
to loosen the grip of this approach on our discipline. We can agree, I believe, that 
scientific objectivity is about avoiding partial, biased, and unsupported views in order to 
get the fullest and most impartial view of a phenomena possible. It is about taking an 
open‐minded, systematic, and investigative approach to the world. Along with economist 
Amartya Sen (1992), feminists argue that an adequate notion of objectivity comes from 
the approach of submitting the results of any research for testing by larger communities 
of scientists (Keller 1985; Longino 1990; Harding 1995), not from following a narrow 
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methodology. Continued loyalty to Max U theorizing at all costs, in contrast, acts more 
like a Procrustean bed: In forcing dimensions of a phenomenon to fit into a particular 
pre‐determined mental framework, elements of reality that do not fit must be contorted or 
lopped off. 
 
Why is this a problem? First, nowhere in serious psychology or neuroscience— 
unless imposed by collaboration with an economist—does one find support for the idea 
that somewhere in the human mind is a mechanism that maximizes a single‐valued 
function representing all we value in life. While economists habitually start from this 
preexisting framework, in the larger project of scientific investigation any model should 
have to prove, starting from the ground up, that it creates some "value‐added." I have 
seen few economists so far, given the existing biases in the profession, even realize that 
the Max U framework requires any justification, much less provide convincing proof of 
its usefulness.6 Historically, the model of Max U did not come from empirical 
observation of how people actually behave, but rather may be more directly traced to 
John Stuart Mill's (1836) suggestion that economics model itself after geometry as a 
"science" of pure deduction. Why that suggestion (much nuanced by Mill himself, though 
not by later adopters) should still hold sway over contemporary economics is somewhat 
of a mystery, perhaps only partly explained by its appeal to masculinist biases. 
 
The second reason that Max U is a problem is that exclusions and distortions it 
forces on us affect the reliability of what we think we know. As economists learned (or 
should have learned) from the study of expectations in macroeconomics, taking only 
selected aspects of a problem out of context, and then assuming that we have estimated 
stable behavioral parameters on the base of partial information, is a procedure doomed to 
failure. Questions such as "What makes us happy?" and more generally, "What is the 
purpose of life?" and "How should we live?" —have troubled and inspired novelists, 
poets, philosophers, theologians, and serious thinkers of all sorts for millennia. It will be 
a pity if economists feel that these need to be translated into the rigid, one‐sided 
framework of conventional modeling, before their implications for economic life can be 
explored. 
 
Let us examine some of the important aspects of HIR that are prevalent in 
systematic and informed investigations of these topics in other disciplines, but not yet in 
the economics literature. I suggest that a deeper self‐education in these areas, and further 
exploration of them using rich concepts and, if necessary, qualitative methods such as 
interviews, focus groups, narratives, and case studies, would be an extremely fruitful vein 
for economists to pursue. 
 
There are, for example, important dimensions of happiness identified in the 
psychological literature that economists, with our focus on scales measuring SWB or life 
satisfaction, or positive affect, have so far ignored. While psychologists Edward Diener 
and Robert Biswas‐Diener, for example, sometimes use the term "happiness" to mean 
only positive affect, their more general notion of human goals includes not only affect 
and subjective life satisfaction, but also "the feeling that life is full of meaning…and a 
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sense of spirituality that connects people to things larger than themselves" (2008, 6)— 
topics they discuss at great length. Psychologist of happiness Jonathan Haidt also 
discusses the role of belonging, meaning, and feelings of the sacred (2006, Chapters 6, 9, 
and 10). Such factors as "belonging" and feeling a part of "things larger" than oneself do 
not fit well into the methodological individualism of the Max U model. Meaning and 
spirituality are not things that an individual agent can "have," in the same way that one 
can "have" a dinner or a car. 
 
For this reason, I have chosen to talk about "interpersonal relations" rather than 
"relational goods" in this talk. The phrase "relational goods" seems to presuppose that 
first we have an individual, and then that individual "has" relationships, meaning, and 
happiness. Consider, though, the contrast between the following discussions presented 
scholars from divergent fields. Economist Bruno Frey suggests that people may have "an 
intrinsic motivation to care for others' welfare. For example, people care about recipients' 
utility and receive a 'warm glow' from helping, or they benefit from intrinsic work 
enjoyment" (2008, 80). Note Frey's implication is that people care because they get 
something back, even if what they get back is just a good feeling. Religious studies 
scholar Mikael Lundmark, on the other hand, points towards possible motivations other 
than getting something back for oneself, in this passage on nursing: 
 
For the sake of clarity, I propose that a factor like ‘nursing brings a sense of 
meaning to life’ is extrinsic, whereas a factor like ‘nursing is the meaning of life’ 
is intrinsic. The major difference between these two factors is that the former is 
motivational because it provides a sense of meaningfulness to life. The act of 
nursing or being a nurse satisfies a need [for] feeling meaningfulness in life…The 
latter factor is motivational because the act of nursing or being a nurse is a 
consequence of a feeling that nursing is the meaning of the life. 
(Lundmark 2007, 772) 
 
This reverses the whole logic of the Max U model: Instead of a pre‐existing 
individual going out and finding warm feelings or meaning to insert in their utility 
function, the sort of action discussed by Lundmark arises from starting with a larger 
whole of life, and locating one's role, identity, and meaning within it. Perhaps, while 
Frey's notion comes from "separativeness," Lundmark's formulation verges on 
"solubility." I suggest that the most interesting investigations will come from keeping 
both the aspect of life having to do with individual agency, and the aspect of our mutual 
co‐constitution in and through relationships, in tension with each other. 
 
In addition to cross‐disciplinary analysis, cross‐cultural analysis can be 
enlightening. Questions about individual life satisfaction, framed by researchers raised in 
an individualistic culture, may more or less make sense when presented to people also 
raised in an individualistic culture. The evidence suggests, however, that people are quite 
differently oriented in more collectivist cultures. While a collectivist bent is most 
commonly associated with certain traditional Asian communities, it is arguably also 
characteristic of women's cultures in communities built around separate‐soluble gender 
15 





traditions. Consider, for example, the response of one woman in South India to 
questioning from Robert Biswas‐Diener about her level of happiness: "You should go ask 
my husband how he feels right now, and then you will know how I feel" (Diener and 
Biswas‐Diener 2008, 134). "Individualists weight their happy feelings more when 
reporting life satisfaction," Diener and Biswas‐Diener report, while "collectivists…are 
more likely to feel good when the group they are a part of is getting along well" (Diener 
and Biswas‐Diener 2008, 134). While the woman in South India obviously goes to a 
"soluble" extreme, I have to wonder whether some people interviewed with standard 
surveys might like to also question the questions: "What do you mean, how happy am I? 
How can I be happy when my neighbors are hungry?" Or, for the more globally 
conscious, "How can I be happy while people are being slaughtered in Darfur? Or "While 
the health of my grandchildren is threatened by rising levels of CO2?" 
 
And here, of course, one enters the paradox that happiness is most likely to 
come to people who are not directly seeking it. Much of the literature suggests that 
deep, long‐lasting happiness is a side effect of serving others, appreciating beauty, not 
being self‐centered, experiencing the sacred, and being willing to put up with a certain 
amount of stress and negative affect in the pursuit of meaningful goals. Deiner and 
Biswas‐Diener argue that happiness in the sense of maximizing positive affect is not a 
good thing to maximize: Some amounts of negative affect are helpful (21, 44). Guilt, for 
example, can be a useful emotion for keeping societies together. They advise, "In order to 
make happy choices, listen to your heart, don't worry about getting the very best all the 
time, and evaluate each outcome on its own merits rather than against others." (177, 
emphasis added). Psychologist of happiness Haidt concurs (2006, 102). 
 
Being more hesitant to reduce a problem to a single quantifiable maximand, and 
more open to qualitative methods, then, would be a useful direction for further economic 
research. A study in the most recent issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, for 
example, combines survey and interview data to good effect. Sergei Guriev and Ekaterina 
Zhuravskaya (2009) complement quantitative analysis from the World Values Survey 
with interviews that delve into the various dimensions of, and reasons for, satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction. The focus‐group interview data allows them to—without imposing a 
pre‐set framework or set of possible answers on their subjects—examine the roles played 
by increasing inequality, deteriorated public goods, changed aspiration levels, and other 
factors mentioned by these groups. Quotes from the qualitative information enliven the 
article. 
 
Being less focused on finding precise and elegant conclusions, and more tolerant 
of richer and more complex analysis, would also pay off for HIR researchers in warning 
us away from misleading aggregation. I am puzzled, for example, when a researcher 
claims that "divorce is beneficial" based on positive changes in average happiness (Frey 
2008, 92). The slightest familiarity with real‐world social relations should make it 
obvious that the distribution could be expected to be wildly bi‐modal, between those who 
instigate a divorce and those who find it thrust upon them. I always tell my Statistics 
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students about the statistician who drowned trying to cross a stream that was an average 
of a few centimeters deep. 
 
A better‐educated and cross‐disciplinary approach would, in addition, protect us 
from presenting biased or shallow results as if they are capturing the full phenomenon 
under study. Measuring the number of social groups people belong to, whether they are 
married or not, and the frequency of their church attendance, for example, can be an 
interesting exercise. But we need to stay aware that answers to such survey questions still 
leave us very far from addressing many of the really interesting questions about 
happiness. Happiness is certainly as much about quality as it is about quantity, and such 
questions capture nothing about the authenticity of a person's relationships or their 
experience of the sacred. 
 
Going beyond our customary methods, of course, might mean learning new skills 
of primary data gathering and qualitative analysis, and perhaps, correspondingly, making 
somewhat less use of many of our existing mathematical modeling skills. This may be an 
unattractive idea to many, since there is a natural human inclination to want to put one's 
skills, in which one has deeply invested, to good use. We teach our undergraduates, 
however, that rational decision making requires ignoring sunk costs— that is, past 
resource allocations that are now "water under the bridge." Rational decision‐making, we 
say, means moving on to see a problem in terms of current and future issues. If we want 
to venture into psychological and social issues, and the best research in psychology and 
social psychology tell us that our existing approaches are too narrow and limiting, then it 
is time to change our approaches. 
 
Going beyond Max U would also, of course, tend to mean that our studies may no 
longer be as characterized by as much formality and the elegance, parsimony, abstract 
generality, and precision that formalism potentially brings with it. But while elegance, 
parsimony, abstract generality, and precision are good things to have, they are far from 
the only things we should be valuing in science. Giving up precision simply to be "vague" 
would be a bad idea, but sometimes when dealing with the complexity, richness, and 
particularity of real world phenomena, we would be better off balancing our desire for 
precision with an appreciation for richness of analysis, as illustrated in Figure 5. 
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In this way, methods of quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis, formalized and less 
formal analysis, research where we try to take the most general and multiperspective‐ 
informed objective viewpoint, and research where we own up to our particular 
perspectives and values, can all be seen as complementary rather than competitive or 
hierarchically ordered. And maybe, with appropriate modesty and a willingness to 
exercise our brains past long‐held gender schemas, we will be able to get more than a 
shallow grasp on the issues of HIR. 
 
Does this mean that economics will lose its identity as a distinct field? If we limit 
ourselves to currently popular definitions of the field, this certainly seems a possibility. 
Definitions of economics often center around rational choice, or markets, or the modeling 
technique of Max U. But the definition of economics as the science of abstract rational 
choice is undercut by the discovery of the importance of emotions and other bodily, 
evolved processes. Discovery of the importance of intrinsic motivations and sociality in 
creating well‐being challenge the idea that economics is all about market exchange. 
Questions of the adequacy of methods challenge the definition in terms of Max U 
formalism. 
 
Will economics then become nothing different from psychology, sociology, or the 
humanities? I think not, although there are many significant possibilities for collaboration 
across these fields. An important—and very old—definition, still used by economists of 
feminist, social, and institutional stripes—is that economics is the study of the ways 
societies organize themselves to provide for the survival and flourishing of life. This 
definition does not rely on dogmas, or on biased valence given to "hard" versus "soft" 
analysis, yet it distinguishes the field from others that do not have "provisioning" as their 
central concern. It also defines the field, not in terms of artificial boundaries of an 
intellectual playground, but in terms of the sort of analysis that we all need to live, and to 
continue to evolve as a species. In a time of broken economies, broken financial and state 
institutions, and a broken planet, dedicating ourselves anew to studying the task of 





As researchers in the areas of happiness and interpersonal relations have pointed 
out, human behavior is actually much complex than imagined within neoclassical 
orthodoxy. The neuroscience of cognitive gender schemas can help explain why certain 
partial views have been so persistent—that is, why topics and assumptions associated 
with masculinity and "hardness" have long enjoyed unquestioned, though undeserved, 
high status. We as a discipline have historically spent far too much time resisting 
becoming "soft," when we should have instead‐‐if we want a truly scientific, 
open‐minded, systematic and investigative approach to the world‐‐have been rooting out 
archaic dogma, including biases of a "masculinist" variety. 
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Yet the persistence of a one‐sided reliance on individualist models and rigid 
formalization in much of the study of happiness and interpersonal relations is a sign that 
we still have far to go in overcoming our ingrained, schematic processing habits. Being 
able to think outside these boxes—being able to respond appropriately to the task at hand, 
instead of some other past experiences and positional aspirations that shaped our 
thought—is a sign of mental agility and vitality. Here's hoping that continued research in 
happiness and interpersonal relations will be marked by such agility and vitality. 
 
 
Julie A. Nelson is a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Development and 
Environment Institute at Tufts University and an Associate Professor of Economics at the 
University of Massachusetts, Boston; inquiries can be directed to Julie.Nelson@tufts.edu 
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NOTES 
1 Linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson (1980) argued in their book Metaphors We Live 
By that much of our way of understanding and speaking about the world is build on just such basic bodily 
experiences. Not having 21st century neuroscience at hand when I began my work in this area, my early 
work on gender and economics used Lakoff and Johnson's insights along with those of psychologist Sandra 
Bem (1981) (Nelson 1992). 
 
2 For example, see Pugno (2007), Bechhetti, Pelloni, et al (2008), and Uhlaner (1989). 
 
3 For example, Bruni and Sugden (2009) emphasize a concept of "structural" team reasoning in which, it 
seems, individual motivation may play no role at all. Van Winden, Stallen et al. write about the "merger 
between the self and other into some shared identity, accompanied by a ('we') feeling of bonding..Oneness" 
(forthcoming, 17). 
 
4 It is never explained, for example, in Bruni and Stanca (2008), whether time spent with one's own spouse 
or children is included in "time with family." Bruni and Sugden lament that in relationships, "Sadly, 
dependency is sometimes unavoidable," (2009) but is this really so sad in the case of children? Sacco, 
Vanin and Zamagni write that "Examples of socially provided goods include friendship, social approval, 
social identification, mates and social status" (2004). Relations of care, such as the care given from parents 
to children, is conspicuously absent. Many authors (e.g. Clark, Frijters et al. 2008, 118; Frey 2008) take as 
definitive Becker's partial views on the family, which emphasize altruism or reciprocity and specialization, 
while downplaying issues of power and benefits from diversity in tasks activities. Within the psychology of 
happiness and relationships, of course, family relationships and especially parent‐child relationships play a 
pivotal role (e.g. Haidt 2006). 
 
5 This also carries over into professional work: Women in the profession of nursing are sometimes assumed 
to be interested exclusively in the well‐being of their patients, and not at all in receiving fair payment for 
their time. See Nelson and Folbre (2006) for a discussion. 
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